Although the agreements explicitly mention improving Afghanistan`s connectivity with the world as an advantage of Indian investments in the region,[334] Afghanistan`s political instability could limit the potential benefits of transit corridors to population centers near Kabul or Kandahar,[335] as these routes cross southern and eastern Afghanistan, where the Taliban are most active. [336] The Chabahar plan is based on links to the Afghan ring road. [337] In August 2016, it was discovered that the Taliban had seized vast tracts of land in Helmand province and threatened to seize the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah,[338] which lies on the part of the Afghan ring road that connects Chabahar to Kandahar and Kabul. As a result, parts of the Afghan ring road have been closed due to Taliban insurgent activities. [339] Also in August 2016, the Taliban claimed responsibility for an attack that killed twelve foreign tourists while traveling on an alternative route to the Afghan ring road between Kabul and Herat. [340] In September 2016, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani expressed his country`s interest in joining CPEC during a meeting with Nawaz Sharif. [341] China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a massive bilateral project to improve infrastructure in Pakistan for better trade with China and further integration of countries in the region. The project was launched on April 20, 2015, when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed 51 agreements and memoranda of understanding worth $46 billion. The CPEC`s goal is both to transform Pakistan`s economy – by modernizing its road, rail, air and energy transport systems – and to connect Pakistan`s deep-water ports of Gwadar and Karachi by land to China`s Xinjiang province and beyond. (Xinjiang borders the countries of Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, and the ancient Silk Road ran through its territory.) This would reduce the time and cost of transporting goods and energy such as natural gas to China by bypassing the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The announcement of joint space and satellite initiatives between Pakistan and China, led by the CPEC, followed in 2016. CPEC is part of the broader Belt and Road Initiative to improve connectivity, trade, communication and cooperation among Eurasian countries, announced by China in 2013. The CPEC has been compared to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II in its potential impact on the region, and many countries have expressed interest in participating in the initiative.

Beijing continues to be frustrated by the growing backlog of China`s independent power producers (IPPs), which amount to about $1.5 billion. Not only does he want these arrears to be settled, but he also reiterates his call on Islamabad to set up a revolving fund to ensure the timely payment of fees to IPPs. And it refuses to renegotiate costly power purchase agreements. In August 2016, Quetta was hit by a terrorist suicide bombing that killed 70 people,[372] while sectarian militants still frequently target Shiite Hazaras in Balochistan. [370] SK Hydro Consortium is building the 870 MW Suki Kinari hydroelectric project in the Kaghan Valley in Pakistan`s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province for $1.8 billion[186] SK Hydro will build the project with funding from China`s EXIM bank. [187] The Indian government, which has strained relations with Pakistan, opposes the CPEC project while work to modernize the Karakoram Highway is underway in Gilgit Baltistan; Territory that India claims as its own. During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi`s visit to China in 2015, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj reportedly told Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping that projects passing through Gilgit-Baltistan were “unacceptable” because they require construction in the claimed area. [438] [439] Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar also confirmed that the issue was raised with the Chinese government during the trip. [440] Swaraj reiterated this position during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in August 2016, declaring that India would “resolutely oppose” the Kashmir corridor.

[441] The CPEC has implications for U.S. interests. The United States does not necessarily have to worry about building new roads, railways or even ports in Pakistan. The United States should welcome them if they are economically viable and contribute to Pakistan`s economic growth and political stability. The N70 project is not officially part of the CPEC, but will connect the west orientation of the CPEC to the Karachi-Lahore highway in Multan. The project is funded under a $195 million Asian Development Bank program announced in May 2015 to upgrade the N70 National Highway and the N50 National Highway. [134] In January 2016, Pakistan`s UK Department for International Development announced a $72.4 million grant for road improvements in Balochistan province, reducing the Asian Development Bank`s total loan from $195 million to $122.6 million. [135] During the further development of the CPEC, natural selection can decide winners and losers. And here we can see how federalism works for the benefit of Pakistan. Each Pakistani province has a special economic zone linked to the CPEC for which it solicits Chinese investment. Interprovincial competition could force them to improve their game. The Khan government is now working hard to work hand in hand with its Chinese counterparts, hoping to overcome the damage caused by CPEC`s criticism in the past.

But unfortunately, it is more than the current ruling party`s unaddressed reservations about CPEC`s inefficiency and incompetence that are becoming the cause of bottlenecks in the implementation of multi-billion dollar projects, precisely at a time when Chinese investors are less and less interested in unprofitable but politically correct projects. That`s why the path to the CPEC is getting longer by the day. Under the CPEC`s Early Harvest program, more than 10,000 megawatts of electricity generation capacity are to be developed between 2018 and 2020. [30] Although some early harvest projects will not be completed until 2020, the Pakistani government plans to inject about 10,000 MW of power generation capacity into Pakistan`s electricity grid by 2018 by completing projects that complement the CPEC. Prime Minister Imran Khan attends the signing ceremony of the Rashakai Special Economic Zone Development Agreement in Islamabad on September 14, 2020 Other LNG projects are currently under construction with Chinese support and funding, which will expand the scope of the CPEC but are neither funded by CPEC nor officially considered part of CPEC. The 1,223 MW Balloki power plant is currently under construction near Kasur and is being built by China`s Harbin Electric Company with funding from China`s EXIM bank. .